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Since the advent of the widespread use of the administrative
process, the procedure that such quasi-judicial tribunals should
follow has not been uniformly settled. Such methods are not
necessarily those that courts must use. The Supreme Court of
the United States has pointed out that the differences in origin
and function between the courts and administrative agencies pre-
cludes a transplantation of the rules of procedure from courts to
agencies. "4 Beyond this statement of what is not the procedure
for all administrative tribunals, we may only say that what shall
guide each individual agency is the procedure set up the statute
being administered or in regulations passed pursuant to such
statute.
In Wignall v. Fletcher25 the procedure prescribed by the dif-
ferent sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was under consid-
eration. The petitioner (eighty years of age) had become involved
in an automobile accident without any negligence on his part. He
later received a notice from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
to appear for a hearing pursuant to § 71 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law to determine whether he had any physical disability which
which might require suspension or revocation of his license to
drive. A hearing was held, and the report of the Commissioner
stated that he found the petitioner in good physical condition;
however, the Commissioner required that petitioner take a road
test before entering any final determination in the case. Peti-
tioner failed the test, and the decision of the Commissioner became;
"Revoke License, Failed Test". Petitioner was then notified that
he had failed a test pursuant to § 20(8) of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law, and that his license was revoked. Petitioner appealed to the
Appellate Division for review, and the revocation was annulled."'
The court treated the revocation as being made pursuant to § 71,
and remitted the case with instructions to the Commissioner to
make findings in support of whatever determination he might
reach.
Another hearing was held by the Commissioner under the
same case number as the first proceeding, and again the driver's
test was ordered. Petitioner took the test and failed for the second
time. Findings were made and entered under the original case
number, and the same notice of revocation was given under
§20(8). Petitioner again 'appealed to the Appellate Division,
24. F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134 (1940).
25. 303 N. Y. 435, 103 N. E. 2d 728 (1952)-
26. 277 App. Div. 828, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 314 (4th Dep't 1950).
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which again annulled the determination of the Commissioner ;27
this time on the ground that petitioner had not been offered the
proper opportunity to be heard provided for in § 71(3) (b) of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Commissioner then appealed to the
Court of Appeals, contending that the proceeding under § 71 had
concluded with the first road test and that subsequent proceedings
were held pursuant to § 20(8), which requires no hearing.
The Court of "Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, taking
the position that the proceeding was instituted under § 71, while
the revocation was made under § 20(8). Because the two sections
have separate and distinct methods of procedure, due process
required that petitioner have been informed as to which part of
the statute the Commissioner was proceeding under.2" Action
taken under one section of a statute may not be justified because
such action could have been taken under a different section of the
statute.29 If the Commissioner required the road tests pursuant
to § 20(8), he should have notified the petitioner that the § 71
proceeding had terminated with the physical examination and that
further proceedings were being conducted under § 20(8).
Desmond, J., dissenting,-" felt that the original § 71 proceed-
ing was duly held and resulted in no revocation or suspension,
since the Commissioner found no physical disability. Both road
tests were then required of petitioner under § 20(8), which re-
quires no hearing or formal notice. Thus, the Commissioner
proceeded in a manner allowed, and nothing shows that anyone
was confused or prejudiced by the action.
In Weeks v. O'ConeIP1 a procedural problem was also pre-
sented. Again the objection was that the agency had not followed
proper procedure. The Liquor Authority had revoked petitioner's
license on the ground that he had permitted trafficking in narcotics
on the premises. A hearing was held before a hearing commis-
sioner, who decided that the charges were sustained by the evidence
adduced at the hearing. The record and the hearing commis-.
sioners report (including his summary of the evidence and pre-
liminary findings) were given to a stenographer to prepare for
submission to the Liquor Authority- for a final decision, in
27. 278 App. Div. 28, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 7 (4th Dep't 1951).
28. Sacharoff v. Corsi, 294 N. Y. 305, 62 N. E. 2d 81 (1945) ; Cole v. Arkansas,
333 U. S. 196 (1948).
29. Hickox ,. Griffin, 298 N. Y. 365, 83 N. E. 2d 836 (1949) ; S. IE. C. v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1942).
30. Loughran, C. J. and FuAd, J., concurring.
31. 304 N. Y. 259, 107 N. E. 290 (1952).
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accordance with statutory procedure. Because it was the last day
of the license period, and the record wouldn't be ready for at
least three more days, the Liquor Authority, in making the
revocation, proceeded on some "notes" prepared by the hearing
commissioner from memory. The revocation was affirmed by the
Appellate Division.2 The Court of Appeals reversed, pointing
out that even though the actual report may have contained sub-
stantially the same facts as were given to the Liquor Authority
in the "notes", and even though the decision may have been the
same, the fact remains that the Liquor Authority cannot wholly
disregard procedural methods set up in the statute and regulations.
From the decision of this case it is clear that administrative
action will not be upheld, regardless of the propriety of the
decision, when the procedure set out in the statute, or regulations
adopted pursuant thereto, has not been closely adhered to. In
Wignall v. Fleher, discussed above, the Court of Appeals held
that administrative tribunals, like judicial tribunals, are bound
to proceed in a manner consistent with the requirements of due
process. An agency. may have express authority to conduct a
proceeding against an individual and to invoke the prescribed
sanctions; however, it may not do so without proper notice to the
individual involved. Such notice includes the requirement that
a person be duly informed whenever there is any change in the
nature of the proceeding against him.
Exhaustion of Remedies
The doctrine referred to as "exhaustion of remedies" stands
for the proposition that before litigants may take their cases to
the courts, they must first exhaust the administrative remedies
available.3 3 Even though a case has been before an agency, and
a determination has been secured therefrom, the doctrine requires
that the whole administrative process be utilized.84 If there is
further process or appeal possible before an agency, the courts will
not assume jurisdiction to review, even though the determination
of which review is sought was made by an administrative
tribunal. 5
A "jurisdictional dispute" between the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen and the Switchmen 's Union involved the inter-
32. 278 App. Div. 917, 195 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (lst Dep't 1951).
33. Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752 (1947).
34. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938).
35. Ibid.
